《论自由·第四章·社会凌驾个人之权力的限度》第2节
Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share (to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others, or wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may then be justly punished by opinion though not by law. As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
注释摘要
这段文字位于第四章的开篇，在论证链条上具有核心的枢纽作用。密尔在全书的布局中，已经在前三章系统捍卫了思想自由与讨论自由，现在他将论证推进到行为自由的领域，试图为个人主权与社会权威之间划定一条清晰的边界。这个段落正是他划定边界的总纲，承担着确立基本原则的功能。他要证明的核心命题是：社会对个人行为的强制权力，无论是通过法律还是舆论，其唯一的正当根据在于防止对他…