《论自由·第三章·个性·论幸福的要素之一》第20节
There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially declared unfit for the management of his affairs; and after his death, his disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation--which are charged on the property itself. All the minute details of his daily life are pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium of the perceiving and describing faculties of the lowest of the low, bears an appearance unlike absolute commonplace, is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity, and often with success; the jurors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses; while the judges, with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in English lawyers, often help to mislead them. These trials speak volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty. So far from setting any value on individuality--so far from respecting the rights of each individual to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. In former days, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead: it would be nothing surprising nowadays were we to see this done, and the doers applauding themselves, because, instead of persecuting for religion, they had adopted so humane and Christian a mode of treating these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts.
注释摘要
这段文字是全章接近结尾时的一处极其锋利的注脚，原文以小号字体印出，但分量极重。密尔在这里把此前关于个性的抽象辩护突然拉到一个非常具体、非常丑陋的法律现实面前，让读者看到，社会对个性的敌意不仅仅是舆论上的冷遇，而是可以穿上法律和医学的白大褂，直接剥夺一个人的自由和财产。 在论证链条上，这一节承接密尔此前对习俗专制和舆论暴政的批评。他已经花了大量篇幅说，社会如…