《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第38节
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions, that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience.
注释摘要
这一段出现在第二章接近结尾的总结处，密尔在前文详细展开了两条主要论证线索之后，现在把整个章节的推理成果浓缩成四个层次分明的理由。这四点在论证上构成一个递进结构，每一层都在上一层的基础上，为思想自由和讨论自由提供更完整的辩护。 第一点回应的是一种最直观的情形：我们试图禁止某种意见的表达，往往是因为我们认定它是错误的。但密尔指出，人并不具有无误的知识能力。压制…