《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第33节
Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost in admiration of what is called civilisation, and of the marvels of modern science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favour; with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst, dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients. Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than Rousseau's were; on the contrary, they were nearer to it; they contained more of positive truth, and very much less of error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau's doctrine, and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided. The superior worth of simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralising effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote; and they will in time produce their due effect, though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted their power.
注释摘要
密尔在这一段里处理的是思想自由论证中一个更精细的分支。他之前已经讨论过两种可能：被压制的意见可能是真的，以及即使公认意见为真、与错误的冲突也有助于我们更深刻地理解真理。现在他推进到第三种、也是他认为最常见的情形——在大多数有争议的重大问题上，相互对立的意见并非一方全对、一方全错，而是各自抓住了真理的一部分。公认意见往往只包含了真理的一个侧面，而且这个侧面常…