《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第22节
To abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians. That it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent. That it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them, so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted. That simple minds, having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them, may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered, by those who are specially trained to the task.
注释摘要
密尔在这一段里处理的是一个非常狡猾的反对意见，而这个意见恰好是他整个论证链条里必须拆掉的一环。在前面，他已经证明，即使我们持有的意见是真理，如果它不被允许接受充分而自由的辩驳，它就会在人心中僵死，变成一套徒具其表的教条，持有者既不懂它的根据，也无法感受它的活力。于是，那些反对自由讨论的人可能会退一步说：好吧，也许让哲学家和神学家去面对反对意见是必要的，但普…