《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第11节
Mankind can hardly be too often reminded that there was once a man named Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time, there took place a memorable collision. Born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness, this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age, as the most virtuous man in it; while we know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspiration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle, "i maëstri di color che sanno," the two headsprings of ethical as of all other philosophy. This acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived--whose fame, still growing after more than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious--was put to death by his countrymen, after a judicial conviction, for impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying the gods recognised by the State; indeed his accuser asserted (see the "Apologia") that he believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a "corruptor of youth." Of these charges the tribunal, there is every ground for believing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind, to be put to death as a criminal.
注释摘要
好的，我们来看这一段。在《论自由》第二章的论证链条中，密尔刚提出了一个核心论点：任何压制言论的行为，都建立在一种对自身无误的假设之上。为了把这个抽象哲学命题砸实，让它变得无法反驳，密尔转向了人类集体记忆中最震撼、最能引发共鸣的历史案例。苏格拉底之死，就是他在这场论证中投下的第一枚也是最重的一枚炮弹，这是一个诉诸情感与历史经验的归谬法。 密尔要证明的正是本章…