《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第5节
I answer that it is assuming very much more. There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right.
注释摘要
这段文字在密尔第二章的论证链条中处于一个关键的转折点。他刚刚摆出了一种可能的反驳意见，这种意见认为，动用公共权威去禁止某种意见的传播，这并不比人类在其他任何事情上基于自己判断去行动更算得上是“假定无误”。如果因为判断可能出错就什么都不做，那人就该放弃所有职责了。这种反驳试图把禁止言论的行为，降格为一种普通的、虽可能出错但必须履行的实践判断。 密尔的回应直指…