《论自由·第二章·思想与讨论的自由》第2节
It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still. First: the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.
注释摘要
这一段是第二章论证的枢纽，密尔在这里把“思想与讨论自由”的正面辩护拆成了两条相互独立却又彼此支撑的路径。在此之前，他已经说明，人们一度以为只要政府与人民利益一致，意见管制就不再是问题，但他恰恰要否认这个前提：即便政府完全代表民意，人民也没有权力去压制异见，因为这种权力本身就是不正当的。由此，他进入了本节真正的主体论证——接下来他要把反对意见压制的理由分成两…