《论自由·第一章·导论》第16节
It will be convenient for the argument, if, instead of at once entering upon the general thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it, on which the principle here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain point, recognised by the current opinions. This one branch is the Liberty of Thought: from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. Although these liberties, to some considerable amount, form part of the political morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free institutions, the grounds, both philosophical and practical, on which they rest, are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion, as might have been expected. Those grounds, when rightly understood, are of much wider application than to only one division of the subject, and a thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder. Those to whom nothing which I am about to say will be new, may therefore, I hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed, I venture on one discussion more.
注释摘要
在这段话里，密尔做的是一个论证策略上的转向，他要告诉读者：接下来不打算一上来就硬碰硬地展开全书最抽象的那条“伤害原则”，而是先挑一个更容易入手、也更容易引起共识的分支来谈，这就是思想自由，连同与之不可分割的言论自由和写作自由。这一步在全书论证链条里的位置很关键。第一章已经完整交代了核心问题——社会对个人权力的合法边界在哪里，也给出了一个初步的答案，即除了防…