《股票作手回忆录·第十二章·棉花惨败·被专家说服》第23节
Like all well-authenticated hoodoos this has its reason for being. What does a man do when he sets out to make the stock market pay for a sudden need? Why, he merely hopes. He gambles. He therefore runs much greater risks than he would if he were speculating intelligently, in accordance with opinions or beliefs logically arrived at after a dispassionate study of underlying conditions. To begin with, he is after an immediate profit. He cannot afford to wait. The market must be nice to him at once if at all. He flatters himself that he is not asking more than to place an even-money bet. Because he is prepared to run quick--say, stop his loss at two points when all he hopes to make is two points--he hugs the fallacy that he is merely taking a fifty-fifty chance. Why, I’ve known men to lose thousands of dollars on such trades, particularly on purchases made at the height of a bull market just before a moderate reaction. It certainly is no way to trade. Well, that crowning folly of my career as a stock operator was the last straw. It beat me. I lost what little my cotton deal had left me. It did even more harm, for I kept on trading--and losing. I persisted in thinking that the stock market must perforce make money for me in the end. But the only end in sight was the end of my resources. I went into debt, not only to my principal brokers but to other houses that accepted business from me without my putting up an adequate margin. I not only got in debt but I stayed in debt from then on.
注释摘要
这段文字出现在利弗莫尔棉花惨败之后，他试图东山再起，却又陷入了更深的泥潭。在讲这段话之前，我们必须先理解一个在当时很普遍、但如今已基本消失的制度环境——保证金交易在那时远比现在宽松得多。1900年代的华尔街，投机者只需存入很小比例的保证金就能控制大量股票，这放大了盈亏，也放大了人性中的贪婪与侥幸。利弗莫尔周围那些想“让市场给自己买貂皮大衣”的人，正是这种环…