《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第39节
How such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible, and why it is necessary, is a problem whose solution does not lie within the bounds of the metaphysic of morals; and we have not here affirmed its truth, much less professed to have a proof of it in our power. We simply showed by the development of the universally received notion of morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably connected with it, or rather is its foundation. Whoever then holds morality to be anything real, and not a chimerical idea without any truth, must likewise admit the principle of it that is here assigned. This section then, like the first, was merely analytical. Now to prove that morality is no creation of the brain, which it cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of the will is true, and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary, this supposes the possibility of a synthetic use of pure practical reason, which however we cannot venture on without first giving a critical examination of this faculty of reason. In the concluding section we shall give the principal outlines of this critical examination as far as is sufficient for our purpose.
注释摘要
这一段是第二节的收束，康德在此对自己的整个工作做了一个清晰的定位。他在这节里做的事情，用他自己的话说，全是分析性的。什么叫分析性的？就是从我们已经接受的、通行的道德概念出发，把这个概念里已经包含的东西拆开来摊开看，而不是凭空给它塞进什么新东西。第一节他分析的是善良意志和出于义务的行动这组概念，第二节分析的是绝对命令和它所要求的普遍立法形式。这一路推下来，他…