《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第35节
Heteronomy of the Will as the Source of all spurious Principles of Morality If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy. The will in that case does not give itself the law, but it is given by the object through its relation to the will. This relation, whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason, only admits of hypothetical imperatives: "I ought to do something because I wish for something else." On the contrary, the moral, and therefore categorical, imperative says: "I ought to do so and so, even though I should not wish for anything else." E.g., the former says: "I ought not to lie, if I would retain my reputation"; the latter says: "I ought not to lie, although it should not bring me the least discredit." The latter therefore must so far abstract from all objects that they shall have no influence on the will, in order that practical reason (will) may not be restricted to administering an interest not belonging to it, but may simply show its own commanding authority as the supreme legislation. Thus, e.g., I ought to endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as if its realization involved any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and the same volition. Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on the Conception of Heteronomy Here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so long as it was not critically examined, has first tried all possible wrong ways before it succeeded in finding the one true way. All principles which can be taken from this point of view are either empirical or rational. The former, drawn from the principle of happiness, are built on physical or moral feelings; the latter, drawn from the principle of perfection, are built either on the rational conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that of an independent perfection (the will of God) as the determining cause of our will.
注释摘要
这段文字是整个第二节最具锋芒的部分之一。康德在这里做的不再是正面建构，而是系统的排除工作。他把此前已经暗示过的对立推到了前台：他律与自律的对立，并且明确宣布，一切不是从意志自身立法出发的道德原则，都属于他律，因而都是虚假的。这不是他个人的偏好，而是从道德概念本身分析出来的结论。因为如果道德命令必须是定言的、无条件的，那么任何依赖对象来给意志立法的原则，都只…