《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第22节
The will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws. And such a faculty can be found only in rational beings. Now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end, and, if this is assigned by reason alone, it must hold for all rational beings. On the other hand, that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end, this is called the means. The subjective ground of the desire is the spring, the objective ground of the volition is the motive; hence the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs, and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material when they assume these, and therefore particular springs of action. The ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions (material ends) are all only relative, for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth, which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition, that is to say practical laws. Hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives. Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws; then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., a practical law.
注释摘要
康德在这一段里要做一件很要紧的事情：他从“意志”这个概念本身的结构出发，引出“目的自身”这个想法，从而为绝对命令找到可能的根基。这不是在宣布道德的内容，而是在追问一个更基本的问题：如果确实存在一种无条件的、对一切理性存在者都有效的实践法则，它必须建立在什么样的基础上？答案的方向是：必须建立在某种本身就具有绝对价值的东西上。 我们先看他怎么一步步推进。开头一…