《道德形而上学基础·第二节·从通俗道德哲学过渡到道德形而上学》第4节
This descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable, if the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and been satisfactorily accomplished. This implies that we first found ethics on metaphysics, and then, when it is firmly established, procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character. But it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry, on which the soundness of the principles depends. It is not only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true philosophical popularity, since there is no art in being intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight; but also it produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and half-reasoned principles. Shallow pates enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat, but the sagacious find in it only confusion, and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves, they turn away their eyes, while philosophers, who see quite well through this delusion, are little listened to when they call men off for a time from this pretended popularity, in order that they might be rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight. We need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite fashion, and we shall find at one time the special constitution of human nature (including, however, the idea of a rational nature generally), at one time perfection, at another happiness, here moral sense, there fear of God. a little of this, and a little of that, in marvellous mixture, without its occurring to them to ask whether the principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human nature at all (which we can have only from experience); or, if this is not so, if these principles are to be found altogether a priori, free from everything empirical, in pure rational concepts only and nowhere else, not even in the smallest degree; then rather to adopt the method of making this a separate inquiry, as pure practical philosophy, or (if one may use a name so decried) as metaphysic of morals, to bring it by itself to completeness, and to require the public, which wishes for popular treatment, to await the issue of this undertaking.
注释摘要
这一段是在回应一个非常实际的写作策略问题，但它背后牵涉的是整个道德探究方法的根本分歧。康德在此毫不含糊地拒绝了那种“先求通俗易懂、以后再讲严格性”的流行做法。这段话的论证目标是确立一个顺序：必须先进行纯粹的、不掺杂任何经验成分的道德形而上学探究，然后才谈得上把成果以通俗的方式呈现出来。顺序一旦颠倒，不仅得不到真正的哲学普遍性，连那所谓的“通俗”也只是一个假…