《道德形而上学基础·第一节·从普通的道德理性知识过渡到哲学的道德理性知识》第13节
I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching penetration to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation, and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation. I do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at least I understand this, that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination, and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which every other motive must give place, because it is the condition of a will being good in itself, and the worth of such a will is above everything.
注释摘要
康德在这一段里把第一节的全部推进收束成一个普通人也能运用的检验程序，同时点明了哲学家下一步该追的问题。到这里，我们已经看到他此前的三步走：善良意志是一切无条件善的唯一所在；出于义务的行动的道德价值不在它要达到的目的，而在决定它的准则；义务就是出于对法则的敬重的行动必然性。现在康德要表明，这个层层收窄的论证并没有把道德知识变成专家秘传，恰恰相反，它让每一个普…