《道德形而上学基础·第一节·从普通的道德理性知识过渡到哲学的道德理性知识》第11节
[Kant's note] It might be here objected to me that I take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling, instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason. But although respect is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through influence, but is self-wrought by a rational concept, and, therefore, is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former kind, which may be referred either to inclination or fear, What I recognise immediately as a law for me, I recognise with respect. This merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law, without the intervention of other influences on my sense. The immediate determination of the will by the law, and the consciousness of this, is called respect, so that this is regarded as an effect of the law on the subject, and not as the cause of it. Respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love. Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as an object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analogous to both. The object of respect is the law only, and that the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in itself. As a law, we are subjected too it without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will. In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination. Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which he gives us an example. Since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents, as it were, the example of a law (viz., to become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect. All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.
注释摘要
这段注释是康德针对一个他预感会遭遇的批评而做的预先回应。批评者会说：你绕了半天，最后把道德动机归结为“尊重”这个情感，这不还是把道德建立在一种模糊的感受上吗？这和那些把道德归于道德感或同情心的做法有什么区别？康德必须在此澄清“尊重”在他的体系里到底是什么，为何它不是一般的情感，而是理性自己在主体心中产生的一种独特的心灵状态。 康德首先承认，尊重确实是一种情…