《道德形而上学基础·第一节·从普通的道德理性知识过渡到哲学的道德理性知识》第4节
And, in fact, we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness, so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction. And from this circumstance there arises in many, if they are candid enough to confess it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason, especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it, because after calculating all the advantages they derive, I do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury, but even from the sciences (which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding), they find that they have, in fact, only brought more trouble on their shoulders, rather than gained in happiness; and they end by envying, rather than despising, the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct. And this we must admit, that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life, or who would even reduce them below zero, is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed, but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end, for which, and not for happiness, reason is properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must, for the most part, be postponed.
注释摘要
这一段在第一节的论证里扮演着一个关键的转折。前面的推演已经确立，善良意志是无条件善的，其价值完全不取决于它所带来的效用或结果，仿佛一颗自身发光的宝石。但康德意识到，这个想法和一个根深蒂固的日常直觉会产生剧烈冲突：如果理性，这个人类最高级的能力，其目标竟然不是用来获得幸福，那理性岂不是一件用处不大甚至帮倒忙的工具？这个冲突如果不面对，普通理性就不会真正接纳那…