《道德形而上学基础·第一节·从普通的道德理性知识过渡到哲学的道德理性知识》第2节
A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition; that is, it is good in itself, and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, nay even of the sum total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a thing which has its whole value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value. There is, however, something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will, in which no account is taken of its utility, that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea, yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy, and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will. Therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view.
注释摘要
康德在这一段里要完成的工作，是把善良意志的价值彻底从一切效果、成就、后果那里剥离开来。他此前已经论证过，世上唯一能无限制地称为好的东西只有善良意志，而各种禀赋、性格品质乃至幸福本身，如果没有善良意志作条件，都可能变成坏的。现在他必须回答一个追问：善良意志本身到底是因什么而好的？如果它的好要取决于它带来的成果，那它就不是无限制的好，因为我们还得看结果如何。于…