《道德原则研究·第九章·结论》第3节
And as every quality which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural, unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sour the temper. We justly, therefore, transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient among men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy, hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have a place in the calendar; but will scarcely ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.
注释摘要
这段论述承担的是整个第九章结论部分的一个关键转折：在正面陈述了“个人价值全在于对己对人有用或令人愉快的品质”这一大原则之后，休谟现在要做一件排除性的工作——他要说明，人们事实上不接受的，恰好就是因为不符合这个标准的那些所谓“德性”。他从描述入手：在日常生活中，凡被承认为个人价值的东西，无一例外都落在有用或令人愉快这两类之下。接着他追问，如果人们依靠自然而不…