《道德原则研究·第九章·结论》第1节
It may justly appear surprising that any man in so late an age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, Useful or Agreeable to the person himself or to Others. It might be expected that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised enquirers concerning morals, and been received from its own evidence, without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind, so naturally classes itself under the division of Useful or Agreeable, the utile or the DULCE, that it is not easy to imagine why we should ever seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or inquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these qualities with regard either to the person himself or to Others, the complete delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven; nor the surface from which the image is reflected, disturbed and confused; a just figure is immediately presented, without any art or attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate examination.
注释摘要
休谟用全书的最后一步论证，做了一件在论证结构上很特别的事：他不是从某个公理出发往下推，而是从读者的直觉往上收。这一段的起点是一个看似漫不经心的感慨——都十八世纪了，居然还需要用复杂的推理来证明一个如此浅显的道理——但恰恰是这个感慨里藏着他整本书最深的一个判断：道德哲学之所以走到了需要辩护如此自明的原理的地步，不是因为这原理太难，而是因为体系与假说已经把人的…