《道德原则研究·第五章·效用为何令人愉快》第12节
A creature, absolutely malicious and spiteful, were there any such in nature, must be worse than indifferent to the images of vice and virtue. All his sentiments must be inverted, and directly opposite to those, which prevail in the human species. Whatever contributes to the good of mankind, as it crosses the constant bent of his wishes and desires, must produce uneasiness and disapprobation; and on the contrary, whatever is the source of disorder and misery in society, must, for the same reason, be regarded with pleasure and complacency. Timon, who probably from his affected spleen more than an inveterate malice, was denominated the manhater, embraced Alcibiades with great fondness. Go On, my boy! Cried he, acquire The confidence Of The people: You Will One day, I foresee, be The cause Of Great calamities To them . Could we admit the two principles of the Manicheans, it is an infallible consequence, that their sentiments of human actions, as well as of everything else, must be totally opposite, and that every instance of justice and humanity, from its necessary tendency, must please the one deity and displease the other. All mankind so far resemble the good principle, that, where interest or revenge or envy perverts not our disposition, we are always inclined, from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the happiness of society, and consequently to virtue above its opposite. Absolute, unprovoked, disinterested malice has never perhaps place in any human breast; or if it had, must there pervert all the sentiments of morals, as well as the feelings of humanity. If the cruelty of Nero be allowed entirely voluntary, and not rather the effect of constant fear and resentment; it is evident that Tigellinus, preferably to Seneca or Burrhus, must have possessed his steady and uniform approbation.
注释摘要
休谟在这一段里做的是一个反证，用极限情境来加固他所主张的那个前提：人天然具有人道之情，也就是对社会福祉的自然关怀。他先设想一种在人类本性里并不真实存在的生物——一个绝对恶意的、完全以他人痛苦为乐的造物。这个生物的情感必须与人类完全颠倒：凡是促进人类幸福的东西，都让他不安和厌恶；凡是带来混乱与苦难的东西，反而让他愉快和满足。休谟提出这个极限反例，不是为了论证…