《道德原则研究·第三章·论正义》第18节
Thus we seem, upon the whole, to have attained a knowledge of the force of that principle here insisted on, and can determine what degree of esteem or moral approbation may result from reflections on public interest and utility. The necessity of justice to the support of society is the sole foundation of that virtue; and since no moral excellence is more highly esteemed, we may conclude that this circumstance of usefulness has, in general, the strongest energy, and most entire command over our sentiments. It must, therefore, be the source of a considerable part of the merit ascribed to humanity, benevolence, friendship, public spirit, and other social virtues of that stamp; as it is the sole source of the moral approbation paid to fidelity, justice, veracity, integrity, and those other estimable and useful qualities and principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of philosophy, and even of common reason; where any principle has been found to have a great force and energy in one instance, to ascribe to it a like energy in all similar instances. This indeed is Newton's chief rule of philosophizing .
注释摘要
这段文字是休谟全章论证的收束，也是一次关键的理论扩展。他从正义这一个案出发，试图把“效用”确立为道德赞许的普遍源泉，这一步走得既大胆又审慎。 我们要看清楚他在这里做了一个什么样的推理。休谟在前文中用大量篇幅证明，正义之德完全建立在它对社会的有用性之上——在极端丰足或极端贫乏的处境中，正义的规则会失效；在人与人之间毫无关爱或完全无私的假设下，正义也没有存在的…