《道德原则研究·附录二·论自爱》第5节
Animals are found susceptible of kindness, both to their own species and to ours; nor is there, in this case, the least suspicion of disguise or artifice. Shall we account for all Their sentiments, too, from refined deductions of self-interest? Or if we admit a disinterested benevolence in the inferior species, by what rule of analogy can we refuse it in the superior? Love between the sexes begets a complacency and good-will, very distinct from the gratification of an appetite. Tenderness to their offspring, in all sensible beings, is commonly able alone to counter-balance the strongest motives of self-love, and has no manner of dependance on that affection. What interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery of that attendance? Is gratitude no affection of the human breast, or is that a word merely, without any meaning or reality? Have we no satisfaction in one man's company above another's, and no desire of the welfare of our friend, even though absence or death should prevent us from all participation in it? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any participation in it, even while alive and present, but our affection and regard to him? These and a thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence in human nature, where no real interest binds us to the object. And how an imaginary interest known and avowed for such, can be the origin of any passion or emotion, seems difficult to explain. No satisfactory hypothesis of this kind has yet been discovered; nor is there the smallest probability that the future industry of men will ever be attended with more favourable success.
注释摘要
休谟在这里发起了一场对自利论最有力的经验反驳。他不再与对手在抽象概念上纠缠，而是直接诉诸任何清醒的人都可以观察到的普通事实。他的策略有两步：先举出人类之外的生命，再举出人类之中最不受哲学粉饰的情感，让自利论的解释在每一个案例上都显得迂曲可笑。 关键的起点是动物。休谟指出，动物对同类乃至对人类显然有善待的行为，而这里绝无可能怀疑它们是伪装或算计——动物没有那…