《道德原则研究·附录一·论道德感》第4节
All this is metaphysics, you cry. That is enough; there needs nothing more to give a strong presumption of falsehood. Yes, reply I, here are metaphysics surely; but they are all on your side, who advance an abstruse hypothesis, which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate with any particular instance or illustration. The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be Whatever mental action Or quality gives To A spectator The pleasing Sentiment Of approbation; and vice the contrary. We then proceed to examine a plain matter of fact, to wit, what actions have this influence. We consider all the circumstances in which these actions agree, and thence endeavour to extract some general observations with regard to these sentiments. If you call this metaphysics, and find anything abstruse here, you need only conclude that your turn of mind is not suited to the moral sciences.
注释摘要
休谟在此处先设想对手的一句反驳：“这都是形而上学，足够说明这套假设是错的了。”这话在道德感争论中常见，意思是：一谈到道德来自于情感，就会被说成是把道德变成一个模糊的主观东西，根本无法清晰认知。休谟接过这个指控，却立刻翻转了箭头：是的，这确实是形而上学，但它是你们的形而上学。究竟哪一边才真正讲不清楚？他的论辩策略不是否认形而上学的存在，而是要看哪一方的假设根…