《乌合之众·第三编·不同群体的分类与描述·议会集会》第16节
Moreover, in reality they only present two serious dangers, one being inevitable financial waste, and the other the progressive restriction of the liberty of the individual. The first of these dangers is the necessary consequence of the exigencies and want of foresight of electoral crowds. Should a member of an assembly propose a measure giving apparent satisfaction to democratic ideas, should he bring in a Bill, for instance, to assure old-age pensions to all workers, and to increase the wages of any class of State employes, the other Deputies, victims of suggestion in their dread of their electors, will not venture to seem to disregard the interests of the latter by rejecting the proposed measure, although well aware they are imposing a fresh strain on the Budget and necessitating the creation of new taxes. It is impossible for them to hesitate to give their votes. The consequences of the increase of expenditure are remote and will not entail disagreeable consequences for them personally, while the consequences of a negative vote might clearly come to light when they next present themselves for re-election. In addition to this first cause of an exaggerated expenditure there is another not less imperative--the necessity of voting all grants for local purposes. A Deputy is unable to oppose grants of this kind because they represent once more the exigencies of the electors, and because each individual Deputy can only obtain what he requires for his own constituency on the condition of acceding to similar demands on the part of his colleagues.[29]
注释摘要
勒庞在这一段里将议会制度的内在缺陷归结为两个彼此关联的危险：一个是无法遏制的财政膨胀，另一个是个人自由的持续限缩。就财政膨胀而言，他的论证建立在议会成员对选民的恐惧之上，而恐惧正是他在本书中反复强调的最强烈的暗示来源。当一个议员提出看似符合普遍民意的法案——比如向全体工人提供养老金或增加某一类国家雇员的工资——其他议员就很难投反对票。因为他们很清楚，拒绝这…